TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF EFFECTIVE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
THE PROBLEMATICS OF EFFECTIVE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
1.0 THE AMBIGUITY OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
The inquiries refering what defines an effectual counterintelligence policy remains a contested thematic in the academic literature devoted to its survey. While the premises advanced to relieve this deadlock are varied, the overall tangibleness of the debatable signifies a cardinal ambiguity at interest that induces both the trouble and importance of the issue. Therefore, as Michael Eftimiades limpidly summarizes, turn toing the particulars of American counterintelligence: “The current absence of a unvarying national CI philosophy is chiefly due to ambiguity in definition and deficiency of centralized control in proclaiming policy.” ( Eftimiades 1997, 286 ) Keeping such an ambiguity in head, the broader counterintelligence job is hence instantly one of a perspectivism. This perspectivism can be found extant within single States, as Eftimiades notes ; furthermore, sing inter-State definitions and employments of counterintelligence, it is obvious that each single State proposes its ain fluctuation of counterintelligence harmonizing to a specific context governed by alone strategic geopolitical concerns and resources. This perspectivism therefore impedes a broader counterintelligence scheme, harmonizing to what is basically a contextual fluctuation that determines the scheme. As Reg Whitaker writes: “A less obvious observation is that counterintelligence operates in a specific political and ideological context, taking its very definition of the intelligence menace in portion at least from the colour of that context.” ( Whitaker 2001, 51 ) Therefore, for illustration, in the Second World War “counterintelligence plans had two general intents. The first was to supply the president and others in the executive subdivision with “pure intelligence” – the necessary informations to do determinations and develop authorities policies. The 2nd intent was to supply preventative intelligence informations for future usage in wartime.” ( Kirkpatrick Davis 1997, 2 ) This contextual fluctuation therefore instantly hinders the job of measuring the grounds for counterintelligence effectiveness and ineffectivity, harmonizing to its undermining of a consistent object of rating.
With these factors in head, we may agree with Gill and Phythian’s averment: “Once we attempt to specify intelligence, it shortly becomes evident that, as a construct, intelligence is every bit elusive as the make bolding fictional agents who have cemented it in the popular imagination.” ( Gill and Phythian 2006, 1 ) What demarcates the immediate footings of the argument of an effectual counterintelligence scheme lies with a cardinal bewilderment as to what intelligence circumscribes as a construct. Thus, many texts in the academic literature straight address these terminological confusions: for illustration, texts bearing the rubrics of “Strategic Counterintelligence: What is it and What Should We make about It? ” by Michelle Van Cleave ( 2007 ) and Arthur A. Zuehlke’s “What is Counterintelligence? ” ( 1980 ) However, it is critical to non allow this confusion as simply the mark of an innocuous semantic argument. Counterintelligence is of cardinal strategic importance, harmonizing to the really matter-of-fact purposes that intelligence and counterintelligence service. Therefore, as Gill and Phythian implore, “Our get downing point should be to acknowledge that intelligence is a agency to an end.” ( Gill and Phythian 2006, 7 ) To minimise the barbarous circle of definitional bewilderment, we therefore hold to Gill and Phythian’s thesis. Regardless of the overplus of definitions of counterintelligence and its contextual fluctuations, what Gill and Phythian term “the means to an end” , e.g. , the clear matter-of-fact teleology at work in intelligence and counterintelligence, remains an grim Centre: Intelligence and counterintelligence possess a clear useful map for the several nation-State that employs them.
Counterintelligence nevertheless is farther debatable because it consequences in a certain doubling of the initial confusion sing intelligence. It functions within the scope of intelligence, yet denotes its ain specific zone of operation. This zone is qualitatively heterogenous to intelligence itself, whichever definition may be applied to the latter: moreover, counterintelligence implies an even more covert degree of activity, as it operates on this subterraneous impression of intelligence. Loch K. Johnson observes that “intelligence bureaus have been treated as exclusions from the remainder of authorities. They are hidden from public position, enjoy particular entree to high councils of authorities, and are given broad discretional powers to guard against menaces to the state ‘s security.” ( Johnson 2004 ) Therefore, sing the secretiveness of intelligence, counterintelligence may be read as an even more radically vague subdivision of the former. Therefore, there is the theorized bias that counterintelligence represents a kind of “dirty intelligence” , harmonizing to its more radically covert actions. As Godson notes, “counterintelligence is viewed as the stepchild of intelligence” ( Godson 1995, 95 ) .
However, in so far as counterintelligence is thought in footings of intelligence, it may be understood as safeguarding the additions of intelligence ; utilizing Gill and Phythian’s matter-of-fact teleological abstraction, it may be stated that counterintelligence safeguards the really “means” , while synchronously moving out towards its specific “ends” which are consistent with those of intelligence. Therefore, a scheme for counterintelligence relies on an understanding itself of the purposes, or in Gill and Phythian’s footings, the precise terminals of intelligence. As effect, the relation of counterintelligence and intelligence has to be clearly delineated, as does the “ends” that are determined by the aforesaid context of the peculiar State that uses counterintelligence. With these initial jobs in head, in the undermentioned paper we will get down by trying to specify counterintelligence in relation to intelligence and the State, followed by an history of counterintelligence that notes the troubles inherent to the latter, and reasoning with a sum-up of the extant deadlocks to effectual counterintelligence.
2.0 EXAMINING THE ( IN ) EFFECTIVITY OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
2.1 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE AND THE STATE
In her provocative article “Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What Should We Make About It? ” Michelle new wave Cleave points out the inchoate thought of counterintelligence. What is glowering about this deficiency of a thought of counterintelligence is the latter’s polar function vis-a-vis intelligence. Mentioning Don Steury’s seminal analysis of intelligence, new wave Cleave highlights the undermentioned disagreement:
CIA historian Don Steury has written: “In believing about intelligence, Sherman Kent began with an apprehension of national power that was good within the mainstream of modern-day American strategic idea. Kent’s part was to use believing about scheme and national power to an ordered construct of intelligence analysis as an rational discipline.” By contrast, “strategic counterintelligence” remains a comparatively undeveloped construct, in theory or execution. Isn’t this funny? For if strategic intelligence takes as its standard the whole of province involvements and the beginnings of province power, so understanding the intent and mode in which other provinces use their intelligence resources to derive advantage and get the hanging the capableness to counter them would look to be the other side of the strategic intelligence coin. ( Van Cleave 2007 )
What Van Cleave shrewdly notes is that if the thesis of the centrality of intelligence to the possibility of State power is accepted, so counterintelligence’s underdevelopment as a scheme needfully betrays intelligence’s effectiveness vis-a-vis the effectiveness of State power. Furthermore, counterintelligence would therefore be critical in the relation between States, in footings of its overthrowing the power of the foreign State harmonizing to a scheme that acts on the critical adjacency between State power and intelligence. Counterintelligence’s relation to intelligence hence would be realized as activities built-in to the State power-intelligence axis, inasmuch as it is inscribed within this axis itself. Van Cleave’s subtextual point here is critical: it is basically nonmeaningful to speak about the State power of a State and keeping or constructing its hegemony without needfully raising the being of other States. And furthermore, to the grade that other States are based on an isomorphous constituent Centre of intelligence and power, following Steury and Kent’s readings, a counterintelligence plan that acts against the intelligence of the foreign State needfully undermines this constituent Centre of the foreign State. What Van Cleave suggests hence is that the traditional separation noted between intelligence and counter-intelligence undermines the effectiveness of intelligence: Van Cleave’s thesis is that counter-intelligence should non be considered as a subdivision of intelligence, but instead an indispensable facet to the latter’s realisation of teleological terminal ends. Van Cleave’s relational thesis is obliging hence in its concise summarisation of counter-intelligence’s function in inter-State dealingss.
However, following Van Cleave’s thesis, counterintelligence differs from intelligence in that it implies a direct relationship between States on the degree of intelligence itself. To clear up this point, one may spot economic dealingss, diplomatic dealingss, etc. , between States – nevertheless, by definition it would look that States would non hold a relationship on an intelligence degree, as this belies the really construct of intelligence. While there is intelligence cooperation between states, intelligence conceived as struggle indicates a persistentde factohostility as opposed to ade jureill will between Nation States. This interaction at the covert degree between States in a hostile mode possibly indicates some of the misinterpretations and debasements of counterintelligence. However, following Van Cleave’s thesis, this hostility is necessary to let for the intelligence teleology to be realized. Therefore as Van Cleave notes, “The signature intent of counterintelligence is to face and prosecute the adversary.” ( Van Cleave 2007 ) Nevertheless, counterintelligence may be read as suspending the friend-adversary duality wholly ; as Susan W. Brener and Anthony C. Crescenzi observe: “Anybody who worked in counterintelligence in a professional capacity will state you the Israelis are among the most aggressive and active states aiming the United States.” ( Brener and Crescenzi, 2006, 2 ) Hence, the critical function between counterintelligence and the State may be summarized as the interaction of States on the degree of intelligence itself ; therefore, counterintelligence is inscribed within intelligence, yet proposes its ain alone footings of dealingss that are in the last case declarative mood of a certain aggression. What is critical about Van Cleave’s thesis is that it hints at one of the jobs to effectual counterintelligence in footings of the latter denoting a relation between States on an entirely covert and counter degree. In subdivision 2.2, we shall analyze how counterintelligence establishes “relations” between States, followed by associating this dorsum to Van Cleave’s thesis about the radically covert and therefore alienated nature of these dealingss.
2.2 PASSIVE AND ACTIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: GOALS AND PROBLEMS
With the relational field of counterintelligence’s use in head, we can now try to farther define counterintelligence, while concomitantly measuring how counterintelligence encounters jobs in its effectiveness. Within counterintelligence itself, there exists a traditional word picture, described by Shulsky and Schmitt as follows: “In gestating what is involved in such a defence against an adversary’s intelligence aggregation, we can get down by separating between inactive and active measures.” ( Shulsky and Schmitt 2005, 99 ) It is of import to handle these two footings clearly as they employ different impressions of “ends” and dealingss to the State context ; as we shall see, this traditional word picture provides a valid foreground processing of an rating of counterintelligence.
In footings of inactive counterintelligence, the latterdoes nonbespeak the direct bilateral hostile battle between States on the degree of intelligence as noted by Van Cleave ; instead, it indicates “security” , or as Shulsky and Schmitt describe it: “seek [ ing ] to deny the antagonist the information he is seeking merely by barricading his entree to it – by, as it were, constructing a wall around it.” ( Shulsky and Schmitt 2005, 99 ) Therefore, as Wettering notes, inactive counterintelligence may be defined as “personnel and physical security.” ( Wettering 2000, 266 ) . Harmonizing to these preliminary definitions of inactive counterintelligence, the effectiveness of the latter could therefore be abstracted as capablenesss for “walling” and blackball evildoings. As Shulsky and Schmitt note the passiveness of the “wall” will emphasize elements such as the categorization of information: “a categorization system categorizes information harmonizing to its sensitiveness, that is to state, the sum of harm its disclosure to a hostile foreign power could do, and therefore, the importance of protecting it.” ( Shulsky and Schmitt 2005, 99 ) Because of the basic nature of inactive counterintelligence’s terminals, e.g. , the protection of intelligence, its effectiveness therefore could be gauged in footings of technological and human factors: effectual inactive counterintelligence therefore can be merely extrapolated as the successful direction of technological and information possibilities in concurrence with the fidelity of those who have entree to information in the categorization system. The step of effectiveness here is reasonably straightforward, as the anomalousnesss that could interrupt its effectiveness would be rather reasonably anticipated ( i.e. , non-loyalty and technological failures ) and inactive counterintelligence besides implies the absence of bilateral ill will between States.
In contrast, it is on the active degree that the full heterogeneousness and tenseness of Van Cleve’s counter history of counterintelligence qua agelessde factohostility on the covert degree of sustained hostile dealingss reaches its full dynamism. Active counterintelligence will hold to explicate precise aggressive schemes, changing harmonizing to the specific adversary and the given context. It is hence on the active degree that the existent problematic of counter-intelligence effectiveness has to be identified, in so far as the active dimension denotes an antagonist gesture as opposed to simply a defence mechanism. It is within active counterintelligence where intercessions are petitioned and where dealingss become complex and declarative of a more dynamic set of dealingss and possible schemes.
Shulsky and Schmitt limpidly define active counterintelligence as follows: “Active steps try to…understand how a hostile foreign intelligence service plants in order to thwart or interrupt its activities and finally turn those activities to one’s ain advantage.” ( Shulsky and Schmitt 2005, 108 ) Shulsky and Schmitt propose the following dislocation of the assorted signifiers of active counterintelligence: “defectors and dual agents, intelligence aggregation, and surveillance operations.” ( Shulsky and Schmitt 2005, 108 ) Each of these peculiar subsets of the active counterintelligence plan represent their ain peculiar diverseness of challenges and therefore the effectiveness of active counterintelligence is distributed and determined by the peculiar subset.
In the instance of surveillance operations, there exists the problematic of designation. What is required is the designation of intelligence officers from which counterintelligence is to run against. Obviously, the designation of intelligence officers is complicated harmonizing to the nature of intelligence officers themselves as trying to stay covert. Therefore, counterintelligence must basically be more thorough than intelligence itself, to the grade that its object is even more hidden than the object of direct intelligence. Furthermore, the effectiveness is farther complicated by the surveyed’s ain preparation in counterintelligence: therefore, their ain employment of inactive counterintelligence qua security steps.
Because of this debatable, Schmitt and Shulsky note that counterintelligence directed against the intelligence information of intelligence services itself is most effectual, as it eliminates the human factor: “The most direct manner to accomplish counterespionage’s ends is to roll up intelligence straight from the hostile service, whether by human or proficient means.” ( Shulsky and Schmitt 2005, 109 ) In this attack, some of the ambiguities of active counterintelligence are instantly surpassed, in footings of a more limpid apprehension of the precise object of active counterintelligence. Nevertheless, the job here is similar to those of surveillance: the intelligence services to be targeted have practiced their ain inactive counterintelligence plans intended for exactly the hindrance of such active counterintelligence operations. ( Shulsky and Schmitt 2005, 109 )
The 3rd facet of active counterintelligence cited by Schmitt and Shulsky is that of the dual agent, the construct bespeaking an intelligence officer now runing for a foreign intelligence service. The effectiveness of this attack is instantly clear, in so far as this attack may be viewed as an already embedded intelligence officer merely relaying information from within the context of the foreign intelligence service, therefore arousing effectual counterintelligence public presentation from within the targeted intelligence service. Hence, while in the other signifiers of counterintelligence there is basically the problematic of an exteriority ( e.g. , the strictly distal jobs of surveillance and direct aggregation of intelligence services ) , the dual agent construct instantly operates from an immanent or interior place within the foreign intelligence service. However, the dual agent construct is complicated by the possibilities of ternary agents, and moreover how to procure a dual agent within his or her domestic intelligence service protected. ( Schulsky and Schmitt 2005, 112 ) Therefore, whilst this attack is viewed by Shulsky and Schmitt as the most effectual, it is evidently complicated by the jobs of set uping a dual agent, and the aleatory factors involved in human dealingss. In topographic point of technological methods, what is required is basically a negotiative duologue between agents that allows this methodological analysis to run efficaciously.
2.3 THE DIFFICULTIES OF ACTIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS A CONCEPT
In add-on to these “regional” troubles tied to the peculiar facet of active counterintelligence under treatment, it is of import to emphasize the jobs of active counterintelligence as a construct. That active counterintelligence operates against foreign intelligence straight relates to an apprehension of foreign intelligence itself. Therefore, in so far as intelligence, as we have noted, is itself hard to find, this means that counterintelligence’s object is radically heterogenous. Furthermore, counterintelligence is non merely engaged with foreign intelligence ; it is engaged at the same time with foreign counterintelligence. This complex web of dealingss and forces hence forces counterintelligence to preliminary identify clear classs: it must divide foreign intelligence from foreign counterintelligence ; it must straight prosecute foreign counterintelligence in both its active and inactive signifiers, whilst concomitantly runing its ain active and inactive signifiers.
Furthermore, it is non plenty to measure these active counterintelligence operations, taking the signifier of covert operations, as simply anomalous. The active counterintelligence quantitative magnitude is described by Lock L. Johnson: “Despite a inclination of observers to overlook this signifier of intercession, the subject is of import ; in modern-day planetary dealingss, covert Acts of the Apostless of ill will between states occur with a high rate of frequency.” ( Johnson 1992, 1 ) Johnson therefore repeats van Cleave’s cardinal thesis about the counter nature of active counterintelligence, while at the same denoting its frequence. Active counterintelligence, despite thede jurepeace between states, is a changeless beginning of ill will and activity that occurs on thede factodegree. Therefore, active counterintelligence besides can be regarded as an indispensable portion of modern-day international dealingss, nevertheless in a certain battleful sense.
Yet despite this frequence, it is the aforesaid heterogeneousness of active counterintelligence which dissipiates the latter’s effectiveness. That is, on the one manus, there are uninterrupted counterintelligence activities ongoing, therefore representing an indispensable, although covert, facet of international dealingss ; on the other manus, the covert nature of these operations, hindered by this really covert facet and the concrete contextual state of affairss they operate in, minimise their effectiveness.
It is possibly so because active counterintelligence operates basically outside of the official dianoetic formations that constitute the dealingss between States, which co-constitutes counterintelligence’s trouble. Active counterintelligence by definition operates in a certain anomalous zone, outside of the de jure dealingss between state provinces. It is this absence of a cardinal normativity to the location of active counterintelligence operations, their fundamentally anarchic context that makes effectual active counterintelligence impeded. In other words, where are the norms and bylaws of the context that could regulate counterintelligence when it is basically runing in a zone without norms or Torahs?
Second, it is of import to observe that it is the really antique de jure nature of active counterintelligence that serves as increasing belligerencies between states harmonizing to their frequence and alienated location of operation. As Johnson notes: “Similarly, covert operations can be arrayed for heuristic intents harmonizing to their grade of meddlesomeness abroad, from nonforcible to physical intervention.” ( Johnson 1992, 1 ) Active counterintelligence is a signifier of intercession: it needfully provokes a ill will from other States. Therefore, it is no surprise that the official US Marine Corps publication on Counterintelligence links the latter to war: “CI, like intelligence, supports all warfighting maps across the spectrum of military operations.” ( US Marine Corps 2007, 3001 )
These belligerencies may attest themselves in the intervened nation’s increasing of inactive counterintelligence, i.e. , of increasing its ain capacity for active counterintelligence or in the most extremist instance, a dislocation of dealingss on thede juredegree because of the consistent agitation on the degree of covert operations. In this respect, counterintelligence is viewed as an act of ill will, and hence is complicated by its nature as an act that can, in its most “forcible intervention” disrupt the de jure dealingss between States: its effectiveness therefore could be tied to the trouble in measuring the chances related to any aggressive intercession.
3.0 Decision: SUMMARIZING THE IMPASSES TO EFFECTIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
In the above text, we have attempted to turn to the troubles in keeping the effectiveness of counterintelligence. What is complicated about the inquiry is the sheer quantitative figure of troubles confronting counterintelligence coupled with the alone qualitative jobs that each of these troubles entail. The jobs we have identified scope from a conceptual position of intelligence and counterintelligence to physical jobs related to the transporting out of operations to international inter-State troubles and the nature of international dealingss itself. These jobs may be summarized as follows:
1.The semantic elucidation of intelligence, which as evidenced by the academic literature, is by no means a homogenous construct. Counterintelligence, following new wave Cleave, nevertheless remains even more equivocal in that it denotes a ignored facet of an already equivocal intelligence construct, therefore radicalizing the job of its definition and range.
2.The split in counterintelligence between its active and inactive spheres does non intend counterintelligence can be understood as a certain “unilateral” gesture. It requires a complicated motion that must take into history different facets of counterintelligence itself. That counterintelligence may be defined harmonizing to the double star of its passive and active versions indicates a farther complication in counterintelligence, as basically this split implies that counterintelligence must be active on two foreparts. As David Cunningham notes, there is a continued problematic of “intelligence activities blurring…key lines between inactive intelligence and active counterintelligence” ( Cunningham 2005, 190 )
3. Within this split, it is the active dimension of counterintelligence that is peculiarly debatable. This is because the active dimension evidently implies an interventionist scheme against intelligence organisations. This activity must take into history both the heterogeneousness of its specific object ( intelligence ) and besides must understand that its ain operations are basically taking topographic point in an alienated zone that is unmindful to the norms of whatever thede jurestate of affairs may be between state provinces.
It is this last facet of counterintelligence’s oblivion tode juredealingss between States that is possibly its most heterogenous facet. That is, does non counterintelligence already connote a certain battleful gesture in its very being, its aggravation of hostility between Nation States? However, it may be conceded that this hostility demonstrates a certain ineluctable fact consisting the being of Nation States: counterintelligence denotes the certain hostile dimension that is ever present in the very impression of Nation States itself ; it invokes this dimension through its really being. At the same clip, it displays the delicate position of all dealingss, in a certain Machiavellian history of the underlying battle for power. The ineffectivity of counterintelligence therefore may be traced exactly to it happening underneath the veneer of normativity, of the societal regulations that bind communities and states together: Counterintelligence basically denotes the covert operating against the covert, demarcating an eternal violent drama between simulacrum.
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