The Ties among Richard Milhous Nixon and the
The Ties among Richard Milhous Nixon and the Chinese and Soviet Governments of His Time: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy from 1969-1974.
Richard Nixon assumed the 37th presidential term of the United States at the tallness of the Cold War and the Vietnam War. Furthermore, he stepped into the leading of a state marked by a deficiency of interaction and battle with the communist universe. Nixon himself was known for his congressional history of “Red runing [ 1 ] , ” yet his presidential foreign policy fostered far closer relationships with Communist leaders than those of held by his recent predecessors. This essay will show an overview of the Nixon Doctrine ; an scrutiny of the ties among Nixon and his coevalss in China and the U.S.S.R. in relation to the undermentioned elements of foreign policy: defence and security, and trade ; and an analysis of some of the restrictions of these ties.
Possibly inspired by the words of Theodore Roosevelt to Chinese Representative Tong Shaoyi in December 1908, Richard Nixon believed that improved dealingss among the world’s world powers would profit all – particularly the United States [ 2 ] . Finding a manner to cut down the demand for defence disbursement every bit good as to go less involved in dearly-won 3rd universe struggles was of great involvement to the Nixon disposal. This was embodied in the Nixon Doctrine, the foreign policy for which the Nixon disposal is possibly best known. The Nixon Doctrine established that, although the United States would back up democratic 3rd universe states by supplying military and fiscal assistance and even a atomic shield, it would non supply military personnels. This papers led to an eventual backdown from Vietnam every bit good as a singular displacement in the United States’ ties with the two Communist world powers – China and the U.S.S.R.
Richard Nixon’s presidential term followed close to two decennaries of silence between the United States and China. This silence, which began at the terminal of the Chinese Civil War or the “Nationalist-Communist Civil War ( 1927-1950 ) , ” was due in big portion to U.S. concerns about the political position of Taiwan. The Chinese Civil War was a struggle between Kuomintang, or the Chinese Nationalist Party, and the Communist Party of China. By the terminal of this civil war, the Communist Party of China had control of mainland China and the Patriots were pushed out to the outlying countries of Taiwan, Penghu, and several Fugianese islands. The People’s Republic of China ( P.R.C. ) established the “One China Policy” which required that all states seeking diplomatic ties to the P.R.C. acknowledge that there is merely one China and that Taiwan is portion of China. At the same clip, China was threatened by the anti-Chinese rhetoric of the United States, frustrated by trade limitations imposed by the United States, and concerned with the presence of U.S. military personnels in Vietnam and in bases near China.
Early ties between the Nixon disposal and the leading of the People’s Republic of China were frequently dependent on pass oning through 3rd parties and were often marred by questionable diplomatic moves by both states. Nixon relied on Pakistan and Romania for many of his earliest, and covert, communications with China. One of his earliest public overtures, nevertheless, was the proclamation that he would back up increased scientific and cultural exchanges with China. The Nixon Doctrine so allowed farther grants and the U.S. bit by bit began to cut down its military presence in Vietnam and near China. The two states began unfastened communications in Warsaw in 1970. However, frustrated by the desertion of one of its citizens and the constitution of U.S. military personnels in Cambodia, China rapidly ended these negotiations. Additionally, China threatened to upset its delicate ties with the U.S. when Premier Chou en Lai visited Hanoi, the capitol of North Vietnam. Yet, this was rapidly overshadowed when the Chinese authorities invited the American Ping Pong squad to the P.R.C. in 1971, a critical public-opinion supporter that has often been referred to as “Ping Pong Diplomacy [ 3 ] .”
Improved dealingss allowed for Nixon’s historic visit to the P.R.C. in 1972. Nixon resolved the trouble that old disposals had with the One China Policy through the Shanghai Communique , signed at the terminal of his trip to China. This understanding stated that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straight agree that there is merely one China and that Taiwan is portion of China. This logical gamesmanship allowed the U.S. and China to work together without great concerns sing the position of Taiwan and enabled the U.S. to keep dealingss with the Republic of China.
The displacement in foreign policy as it related to defence and security besides allowed for the recommencement of trade with China. In June of 1971, Nixon ended the drawn-out trade embargo the U.S. had imposed on China. Although other U.S. leaders, including Dwight Eisenhower, had questioned the value of the trade trade stoppage, efforts to loosen trade limitations with China failed and were seen by some as a manner to “lose face” on the international phase [ 4 ] . Today, China continues to be an of import trading spouse of the United States [ 5 ] , an digesting benefit of the close ties between the Nixon disposal and the leading of the P.R.C..
Possibly ironically, it was the improved dealingss between the P.R.C. and the United States that caused the Soviet Union to reconsider their ain relationship with the United States. Despite their position as communist world powers, the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. had different readings of communism and suffered from frequent struggles. In 1969, Soviet and Chinese military personnels clashed at their boundary line. Each saw the other’s emerging confederation with the United States as endangering. The United States was able to utilize this perceptual experience to play the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. off of one another and to derive an upper manus in its dialogues with each state. Even Ping-Pong Diplomacy is echoed in the visits of a Soviet spaceman and Soviet gymnasts to the United States.
The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were in a ferocious weaponries race that began in 1949 when the Soviets exploded their ain atomic bomb [ 6 ] . By 1969, the United States had lost most of what was one time its atomic high quality over the U.S.S.R. [ 7 ] . Nixon proposed that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. seek non high quality but para in their ownership and development of arms, a policy referred to as “detente [ 8 ] .” If each state had merely adequate atomic arms to guarantee common devastation neither state would hold an involvement in get downing a war. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union remained wary [ 9 ] . Consequently, advancement in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks ( SALT I ) was slow and alternate attacks to making an understanding were turn outing fruitless.
After Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972, dialogues with the U.S.S.R. accelerated. In May of 1972, Nixon visited the U.S.S.R. for a acme with Leonid Brezhnev. The acme was productive and Nixon and Brezhnev signed 10 understandings, including an interim SALT pact, an Anti-Ballistic Missile ( ABM ) Treaty, and a trade understanding. The interim SALT pact limited the figure of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles each state could possess, while leting for replacing of missiles. SALT II negotiations, intended to take to a decrease in atomic arms and forestalling the development of new destructive engineering, began following these understandings and continued beyond the Nixon disposal. Extra understandings included cooperation in scientific discipline and engineering and cooperation in infinite.
Both Nixon and Brezhnev believed that they had the capacity to make better conditions for trade between the two states [ 10 ] . Additionally, it stated that trade should be good to both states and aligned to international criterions ; that a system of recognition should be established ; and that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should place and decide any possible economic and fiscal barriers [ 11 ] . The trade understanding signed during the 1972 acme established that both states would run into once more to work out specific inside informations.
Although the Nixon disposal enjoyed far better relationships with the leading of the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. than old disposals, these closer ties were limited in several ways. First, the softening of dealingss with these former enemies were strategic and non an indorsement of either communist authorities. Second, the closer ties that United States enjoyed with both states were non declarative of improved dealingss between the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. Much to the contrary, the Nixon disposal often used communications and activities with one state to motivate the other state into coveted actions, dialogues, and understandings. For illustration,The Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policywrites that, “Seeking to countervail the emerging detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, Mao invited President Richard Nixon to China [ 12 ] .”Third, the enhanced interactions between the United States and the authoritiess of China and the U.S.S.R. did non bespeak an moderation of U.S. policies against the communist authorities of North Vietnam.
Despite these restrictions, Richard Nixon endeavored to utilize carefully crafted and comparatively close ties with the authoritiess of the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. to accomplish what he believed were the complimentary ends of increased security and economic prosperity. Unfortunately, although Chinese-American dealingss continued to better easy, the policy of detente was rapidly abandoned after Nixon’s surrender [ 13 ] . Therefore, the unambiguously close ties between the United States and the Communist world powers found during the Nixon disposal proved to be more a merchandise of Nixon’s foreign policy and thrust than a form of things to come.
American Experience.2004-2006 PBS/WGBH. [ on-line ] . [ Accessed 11ThursdaySeptember 2006 ] . Available from World Wide Web: hypertext transfer protocol: //www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/presidents/37_nixon/nixon_foreign html..
ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2006. “Governor: President Hu’s Visit Could Open ‘Amazing Trade.”China Daily.[ Online ] . [ Accessed 11ThursdaySeptember 2006 ] . Available from the World Wide Web: hypertext transfer protocol: //www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-03/16/content_541404.htm.
COHEN, W.I. 2006. Nixon in China: A Turning Point in World History.eJournal USA.11( 1 ) [ Accessed 11ThursdaySeptember 2006 ] . Available from the World Wide Web: hypertext transfer protocol: //usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0406/ijpe/cohen.htm.
FRIED, R. M. 1990.Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective.New York: Oxford University Press.
GARTHODD, R.A. 1994.Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relationss from Nixon to Reagan, Revised Addition.Washington, D.C. : The Brookings Institution.
KOCHAVI, N. 2002.A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years.London: Praeger.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS – JAPAN. 1973.Diplomatic Blue Book for 1972: Reappraisal of Foreign Relations April 1972-March 1973.Washington, D.C. : Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Radio Address on Defense Policy. 29ThursdaySeptember 1972. Available on World Wide Web: hypertext transfer protocol: //www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=3672.
WOOLEY, J. and PETERS, G. 1999-2005. The American Presidency Project [ on-line ] . Santa Barbara, CA: University of California ( hosted ) , Gerhard Peters ( database ) . Available from World Wide Web: hypertext transfer protocol: //www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ ? pid=3439.